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Abstract
This paper introduces a technique for measuring the degree of (in)coherence of inconsistent sets
of propositional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal
models of those sets in G. Priest’s Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the information expressed
by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this
technique. In this way, Hunter’s objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for
measuring (in)coherence are addressed.
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1. Introduction
The development of techniques for measuring the amount of information and the degree
of coherence of inconsistent sets of formulas has been recently addressed in the literature.
E. Lozinskii [6] regards the inconsistent data in a set of formulas S of a knowledge
system as a result of information pollution. He assumes, nevertheless, that such a set must
contain a meaningful subset that has to be maximally consistent in order not to lose any
valuable data. Therefore, adapting Shannon’s formula for the calculation of the informa-
tion content of a message, Lozinskii maintains that the quantity of semantic information
contained in S is a decreasing, and logarithmic, function of the size of the set of models of
the maximally consistent subsets of S.
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Wong and Besnard [10] point out that Lozinskii’s technique is defective in two respects:
the presence of tautologies affects the information value of a set of formulas, and his
information measure is syntax-sensitive in the presence of inconsistencies, which yields
counterintuitive results. Wong and Besnard modify Lozinskii’s definition using the para-
consistent logic QC (Quasi-Classical Logic) [1] to measure the amount of information
contained in inconsistent sets of prepositional formulas and overcome the shortcomings of
Lozinskii’s approach.
Several systems of paraconsistent logic, i.e., logics that do not have ex contradictione
quodlibet as a valid rule, which involve a weakening of classical logic have been presented
in the literature. Two alternative taxonomies for these paraconsistent logics can be found in
[2] and [9]. In the case of Quasi-Classical Logic paraconsistency is achieved by restricting
the proof theory so that compositional proof rules like Addition cannot be followed by de-
compositional rules like Resolution. The reader’s acquaintance with Quasi-Classical Logic
and its semantics is assumed throughout this paper.
A. Hunter [4] criticizes Wong and Besnard’s definition as an inconsistency measure
because it does not provide a direct measure of inconsistency and, for example, yields
the same value for {A} and {A,¬A,B}. Hunter uses minimal QC models to measure the
inconsistency of a set of formulas with those models. He defines a measure of inconsistency
called coherence in terms of minimal QC models.
In this paper Hunter’s objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments
for measuring inconsistency are addressed. Furthermore, a measure of inconsistency which
resorts to such a logic, Priest’s Logic of Paradox [7], is introduced. The coherence of
inconsistent sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal LP-models of those sets. The
compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or
domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique.
2. LP-models
Priest’s Logic of Paradox LP is a truth-functional many-valued paraconsistent logic
which provides models for (classically) inconsistent sets of formulas using Kleene’s strong
three-valued matrices [5]. Priest reads the middle value b of Kleene’s strong matrices as
both true and false and takes it as a designated value together with t (true), thus providing
(classically) inconsistent sets of formulas with three-valued models and restricting their
consequences.
Let L be a finitary propositional language and P the set of its propositional letters.
The following definitions characterize the notions of LP-interpretation, LP-model and LP-
consequence for this logic:
Definition 1 (LP-interpretation). An LP-interpretation is a function ILP from P into the set
T3 = {t, b, f } of truth values, which is extended to the molecular formulas of L by means
of Kleene’s strong three-valued matrices:
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Definition 2 (LP-model). An LP-model of a formula A is an interpretation ILP such that
ILP(A) = t or ILP(A) = b, and an LP-model of a set of sentences Γ is an interpretation
ILP such that for every sentence Ai of Γ , ILP(Ai) = t or ILP(Ai) = b.
Definition 3 (LP-consequence). A formula A is an LP-consequence of a set of sentences
Γ , Γ |=LP A, if and only if every LP-model of Γ is an LP-model of A.
In the following section a notion of minimally inconsistent LP-model will be used; it
must be pointed out, though, that the notion defined bellow is related, but not equivalent,
to the one Priest defines in [8]. Priest uses this notion to develop a non-monotonic version
of his LP logic.
Definition 4 (Minimally inconsistent LP-models). An LP-model ILP is a minimally incon-
sistent LP-model of a set of formulas Γ if and only if there is no model ILP’ of Γ such
that the number of propositional letters assigned b by ILP’ is smaller than the number of
propositional letters assigned b by ILP.
3. Measuring coherence using minimally inconsistent LP-models
A. Hunter argues that his QC logic is better suited for the purpose of measuring incon-
sistency than other paraconsistent logics. For example, Priest’s three-valued logic LP is
able to provide models for inconsistent sets of formulas like {A,¬A ∨ ¬B,B}. But, there
are three LP-models for this set while it has only one QC minimal model. According to
Hunter, the gob of models underspecifies the nature of the conflicts.
The number of models for inconsistent sets of formulas can be reduced if minimally
inconsistent LP-models, instead of LP-models, are used. In the case of the set {A,¬A ∨
¬B,B} this number is reduced from three to two; this example also shows that there can
be more than one minimally inconsistent LP-model of a set of formulas.
In what follows a measure of inconsistency will be defined using minimally inconsistent
LP-models, but avoiding the objections above. The inconsistency of a set of formulas Γ is
defined in terms of the inconsistency number of Γ :
Definition 5 (Inconsistency number of Γ ). The inconsistency number of a set of formulas
Γ , IncNum(Γ ), is the number of propositional letters that are assigned b in the minimally
inconsistent LP-models of Γ .
Example 1. Let Γ = {¬p,¬q,p ∨ q,¬s ∨ r,¬r ∨ s}; then IncNum(Γ ) = 1.
The inconsistency function can now be characterized as follows:
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Definition 6 (Inconsistency function). The inconsistency function from sets of well-formed
formulas of L into [0,1] is defined:
Inconsistency(Γ ) = IncNum(Γ )
Pl(Γ )
,
where Pl(Γ ) denotes the number of different propositional letters occurring in Γ .
Example 2. Let Γ = {¬p,¬q,p ∨ q,¬s ∨ r,¬r ∨ s}; then Inconsistency(Γ ) = 14 = 0.25.
In contrast with Wong and Besnard’s inconsistency measure, IncNum({A}) =
IncNum({A,¬A,B}) and, Inconsistency({A}) = Inconsistency({A,¬A,B)}.
A related measure of inconsistency, the coherence of a set of formulas Γ , can be defined
as follows:
Definition 7 (Coherence function). The coherence function from sets of well-formed for-
mulas of L into [0,1] is defined:
Coherence(Γ ) = 1 − IncNum(Γ )
Pl(Γ )
.
Example 3. Let Γ = {¬p,¬q,p∨q,¬s∨ r,¬r ∨ s}; then Inconsistency(Γ ) = 1−0.25 =
0.75.
4. Measuring relative compatibility
When several sources provide information about the same situation each source of in-
formation must be evaluated according to criteria designed to measure their comparative
reliability. Formal models of information evaluation have been offered in the literature;
for example, Laurence Cholvy formalizes in [3] the recommendations offered by NATO
concerning the information evaluation in intelligence.
One of the criteria used to evaluate a source of information is its compatibility with some
previously reported information or some established knowledge, i.e., with the background
knowledge. For example, our background knowledge may be that an observed object is a
plane or an helicopter, and that if the altitude of the observed object is less than 3 km then
the object is not a plane. If several sources provide us with information about this situation,
i.e., about the kind of aircraft observed and its altitude, one of the criteria to evaluate
their reliability will be the compatibility of the information offered with that background
knowledge.
The coherence function defined in the previous section can be used to measure and
compare the compatibility of different information sources Σ1, . . . ,Σn, each one of which
will be assumed to be self-consistent, with the domain or background knowledge ∆:
Definition 8 (Relative consistency of a source with the background knowledge). A source
Σi is more consistent than another source Σj with the background knowledge ∆ if and
only if Coherence(Σi ∪ ∆) > Coherence(Σj ∪ ∆).
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Example 4 (Hunter). Let the background knowledge ∆ = {p ∨ q,¬r ∨ s}, and the
first information source Σ1 = {¬p,¬q,p ∨ q}, while the second information source
Σ2 = {¬p,¬q, r,¬s}. The information source Σ1 is more consistent with the back-
ground knowledge ∆ than information source Σ2 because Coherence(Σ1 ∪ ∆) = 0.75
and Coherence(Σ2 ∪ ∆) = 0.50.
5. Conclusion
In this paper a many-valued paraconsistent logic, Priest’s Logic of Paradox, has been
used to offer direct measures of the (in)coherence of classically inconsistent sets of propo-
sitional formulas.
The minimal models of Priest’s LP logic can also be used to measure the comparative
compatibility of the information provided by different sources with the background knowl-
edge. This measure of comparative compatibility is one of the criteria used to evaluate the
reliability of those sources.
This sort of applications show, as Wong and Besnard point out, that a system of para-
consistent logic can have a role that goes beyond the task of identifying valid forms of
inference, and can be used as a tool for analyzing the information contained in (possibly
inconsistent) sets of formulas.
The measures of (in)coherence in information provided by different paraconsistent
logics and their comparative plausibility from an intuitive point of view deserve further
research.
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